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Introduction	  	  	  	  	  
	  The	  three	  main	  economic	  philosophies	  (Classical,	  Keynesians	  and	  Monetarists)	  did	  not	  help	  in	  preventing	  the	  2007-­‐2008	  U.S.	  financial	  crisis.	  Why	  not?	  	  	  The	   Classical	   economists	   focus	   on	   free	  markets,	   free	   of	   government	   interference	   and	  free	  of	  monopolies.	  They	  missed	  the	  point	  that	  when	  about	  $10	  trillion	  of	  the	  funding	  in	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  market	   is	  based	  on	  borrowed	   funds,	   the	  housing	  market	   is	  no	   longer	  free,	  but	  depend	  on	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  borrowers.	  The	  Keynesians	  emphasized	  the	  need	   for	   government	   interference	   to	   counteract	   recessions	   by	   increasing	   government	  spending	  above	  tax	  receipts.	  The	  U.S.	  experience	  over	  2008-­‐2015	  has	  shown	  the	  fastest	  growth	   rate	   of	   government	   debt	   for	   a	   long	   time,	   but	   this	   did	   not	   help	   individual	  households	   to	   repay	   their	  mortgages.	  Keynesians	  also	  believe	   in	   the	  control	  of	  money	  supply	  but	  they	  do	  not	  link	  prevailing	  interest	  rates	  with	  the	  affordability	  of	  such	  rates	  to	  individual	  households.	  The	  Monetarists	  believe	  that	  banks	  can	  and	  should	  control	  the	  supply	   of	   money.	   It	   will	   be	   clear	   from	   this	   paper	   that	   banks	   did	   not	   control	   their	  mortgage	  lending	  levels	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  Monetarist’s	  emphasis	  is	  on	  the	  supply	  level	  of	  money	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  households	  to	  repay	  outstanding	  loans,	  especially	  those	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  nature,	  out	  of	  the	  incomes	  earned.	  All	  in	  all	  a	  major	  rethink	  of	  policies	  is	  required.	  	  Why	   was	   the	   financial	   crisis	   not	   foreseen?	   House	   price	   inflation	   based	   on	   excessive	  lending	  levels	  was	  not	  regarded	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  economic	  growth,	  contrary	  to	  the	  threat	  from	   cost	   price	   inflation.	   The	   latter	   occurs	   when	   wages	   growth	   or	   costs	   of	   raw	  materials,	  intermediate	  goods	  and	  imported	  goods	  push	  up	  inflation	  levels.	  	  The	  second	  reason	  was	  that	  it	  was	  not	  recognized	  that	  the	  supply	  of	  mortgage	  funds	  as	  provided	  by	  the	  banks	  and	  the	  financial	  markets	  does	  not	  necessarily	  match	  the	  needs	  (or	   demand)	   of	   the	   collective	   of	   individual	   households.	   The	   needs	   are	   based	   on	  population	  growth	   levels,	   changes	   in	   family	   size	   and	   changes	   in	   accommodation	   taste	  patterns.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  about	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  are	  needed	  every	  year.	  The	  needs	  of	  the	   collective	   of	   individual	   households	   are	   also	   based	   on	   income	   growth,	   the	  affordability	   level.	   The	   latter	   is	   especially	   important	   for	   lower	   and	   median	   income	  families.	  Wall	  Street	  thinks	  in	  terms	  of	  profitability,	  while	  Main	  Street	  thinks	  in	  terms	  of	  affordability.	  	  The	  third	  reason	  was	  that	  the	  level	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  base	  rate	  sets	  the	  funding	  cost	  base	  for	  banks.	  Competition	   for	  customer	  deposits	  adds	  an	  additional	  cost	   level	   for	  banks.	  The	  price	   setting	   for	  mortgages	   is	   a	   one	   sided	   process	  whereby	   banks,	   and	   indirectly	   the	  Fed,	   decide	   what	   to	   charge	   to	   their	   customers.	   As	   set	   out	   in	   this	   paper	   mortgage	  customers	  need	  a	  “dynamic	  stability”	  in	  their	  mortgage	  obligations,	  one	  that	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  annual	  CPI	  level	  and	  income	  growth.	  The	  paper	  proposes	  a	  scheme	  to	  break	  the	  link	  between	  the	  cost	  of	  mortgages	  as	  set	  by	  the	  banking	  sector	  and	  the	  mortgage	   interest	  costs	  paid	  by	  individual	  households,	  with	  the	  latter	  instead	  being	  based	  on	  the	  CPI	  level	  plus	   a	   margin.	   Such	   a	   scheme	   will	   stabilize	   the	   financial	   position	   of	   individual	  households	  both	  at	  high	  and	  low	  inflation	  levels.	  In	  some	  years	  a	  surplus	  will	  be	  created	  between	  what	  individual	  households	  pay	  and	  what	  the	  banks	  receive;	  in	  other	  years	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  there	   will	   be	   a	   shortfall.	   The	   U.S.	   Treasury	   could	   accommodate	   such	   temporary	  surplus/shortfall	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  creating	  stable	  economic	  growth,	  in	  what	  could	  amount	  to	  a	  type	  of	  individuals’	  quantitative	  easing.	  	  As	  a	  further	  tool	  for	  putting	  the	  collective	  of	  individual	  households	  first,	  rather	  than	  the	  financial	  sector,	  a	  traffic	  light	  system	  can	  be	  implemented	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  volume	  of	  mortgage	  lending	  when	  needed.	  A	  future	  financial	  crash	  linked	  to	  the	  housing	  sector	  can	  be	   avoided	   if	   the	   separation	   of	  mortgage	   interest	   charged	   by	   the	   banking	   sector	   and	  interest	  levels	  paid	  (based	  on	  CPI	  inflation	  levels)	  by	  the	  household	  sector	  is	  combined	  with	  the	  traffic	  light	  system.	  	  	  ‘Collective	  Households	  Economics’	  may	  be	  a	  new	  variant	  of	  economic	  thinking.	  The	  need	  for	   funds	   approach	   is	   based	   on	   the	   different	   parameters	   for	   the	   collective	   individual	  households	  than	  the	  ones	  that	  rule	  the	  banking	  sector.	  	  	  It	  is	  paramount,	  if	  one	  wants	  long-­‐term	  economic	  growth	  to	  continue,	  that	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  approach	  prevails.	  	  It	  is	  based	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  individual	  household	  customer	  base,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  profit	  levels	  of	  the	  financial	  markets.	  Bridges	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  Collective	  Household	  Economics©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  
	  
1.	  The	  U.S.	  experience	  in	  the	  run	  up	  and	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  
2007-­‐2008	  
	  
1.1	  The	  Collective	  Households’	  mortgage	  levels	  	  The	   term	   Collective	   Households	   is	   used	   in	   this	   paper	   to	   include	   all	   individual	  households	   with	   a	   mortgage	   or	   in	   the	   case	   of	   new	   construction	   levels	   all	   those	  households	   seeking	   a	   place	   to	   live.	   “Collective”	   represents	   a	   group	   of	   individual	  households	  with	   the	   same	   intention	  or	  with	   the	   same	  action	  pattern	   like	  obtaining	  or	  having	  a	  mortgage.	  
	  In	  the	  U.S.	  extensive	  statistics	  are	  available	  to	  track	  the	  developments	  of	  the	  Collective	  Households’	  outstanding	  mortgage	  borrowing	  levels.	  Such	  statistics	  are	  contained	  in	  the	  U.S.	   Balance	   Sheet	   of	   Households	   and	   Nonprofit	   Organizations1.	   From	   these	   statistics	  one	  can	  deduce	  the	  incremental	  home	  mortgage	  lending	  levels	  per	  annum.	  	  The	   U.S.	   Census	   Bureau2	  publishes	   monthly	   and	   annual	   data	   on	   the	   level	   of	   new	  privately	  owned	  housing	  units	  authorized.	  It	  also	  publishes	  annual	  and	  monthly	  median	  house	  prices.	  	  
Table	  1:	  Mortgage	  finance	  and	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  market	  1997-­‐2008	  	  	  















X	  million**	   Median	  House	  Prices	  
X	  
$	  thousands	  1997	   	  	  	  180	   1.437	   125,260	   	   146,000	  1998	   	  	  	  301	   1.698	   177,300	   	   152,500	  1999	   	  	  	  377	   1.699	   221,900	   5.080	   161,000	  2000	   	  	  	  382	   1.463	   261,100	   5.100	   169,000	  2001	   	  	  	  509	   1.670	   304,800	   5.490	   175,200	  2002	   	  	  	  706	   1.655	   426,600	   5.970	   187,600	  2003	   	  	  	  881	   1.897	   464,400	   6.490	   195,000	  2004	   	  	  	  950	   2.002	   474,500	   6.890	   221,000	  2005	   1,053	   2.054	   512,700	   6.850	   240,900	  2006	   	  	  	  998	   1.737	   574,600	   6.420	   246,500	  2007	   	  	  	  701	   1.354	   517,700	   4.410	   247,900	  2008	   	  	  	  -­‐32	   	  	  .923	   Negative	   4.010	   232,100	  
	  
	  
*	  Per	  1	  July	  on	  an	  annualized	  basis	  **	  Per	  December	  of	  calendar	  year;	  statistics	  only	  available	  from1999	  	  1997	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  base	  year	  as	  in	  this	  year	  the	  increase	  in	  mortgage	  lending	  levels	  was	  enough	  to	  fund	  all	  new	  housing	  starts	  at	  a	  cost	  below	  the	  median	  house	  price	  level.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/current/accessible/b100.htm	  2	  http://www.census.gov/construction/bps/pdf/table1a.pdf	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  Collective	  Household	  Economics©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  What	   table	   1	   shows	   is	   that	   the	   volume	   of	   net	   new	  mortgage	   lending	   went	   up	   about	  600%	  between	   1997	   and	   2005;	   new	  housing	   starts	   increased	   by	   43%	  over	   the	   same	  period	   and	   existing	   home	   sales	  went	   up	   by	   35%	   over	   the	   shorter	   period	   1999-­‐2005.	  Median	  house	  prices	  went	  up	  by	  65%	  between	  1997	  and	  2005.	  	  	  In	  a	  paper	  by	  this	  author:	  “The	  U.S.	  experience,	  free	  markets	  in	  money:	  a	  contradiction	  in	   terms”3	  it	   was	   argued	   that	   when	   lending	   growth	   was	   not	   accompanied	   by	   income	  growth,	  the	  whole	  U.S.	  economy	  would	  be	  destabilized.	  	  	  The	  paper	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  supply	  side	  of	  funds	  to	  the	  collective	  households	  granted	  as	  mortgages	  had	  a	  very	  different	  set	  of	  parameters	  from	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  approach.	  The	  latter	  approach	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  section	  1.4.	  	  The	  supply	  side	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  level	  of	  accumulated	  savings	  that	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	   institutions,	   like	   asset	   management	   companies	   and	   pension	   funds	   have	  available	   to	   invest	   during	   any	   given	   time	   period.	   Secondly	   the	   price	   of	   funds	   made	  available	  to	  mortgage	  borrowers	  is	  based	  on	  interest	  rates	  that	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  sets	  from	   time	   to	   time.	   Thirdly,	   banks	   and	   other	   financial	   institutions,	   apart	   from	   most	  pension	  funds,	  are	  profit-­‐oriented	  organizations.	  Profit	  is	  a	  short	  tem	  orientation	  and	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  paper	  may	  not	  easily	  gel	  with	  the	  longer-­‐term	  objectives	  of	  homeowners,	  especially	  when	  actual	  house	  prices	  are	  rising	  faster	  than	  income	  levels.	  	  	  
1.2	  U.S.	  Mortgage	  debts	  in	  a	  wider	  perspective	  over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2014	  
	  
Mortgage	  and	  government	  debt	  levels	  compared	  to	  nominal	  GDP.	  	  
Table	  2:	  U.S.	  Mortgage	  and	  government	  debt	  levels	  compared	  to	  nominal	  GDP	  for	  









X	  $	  trillions	  
U.S.	  Nominal	  
GDP	  
X	  $	  trillions	   Economic	  Growth	  rate	  %	  1997	   	  	  5.413	   	  	  3.753	   	  	  8.608	   	  	  4.5	  2002	   	  	  6.228	   	  	  6.028	   10.977	   	  	  1.8	  2003	   	  	  6.783	   	  	  6.910	   11.511	   	  	  2.8	  2006	   	  	  8.507	   	  	  9.910	   13.856	   	  	  2.7	  2007	   	  	  9.007	   10.613	   14.478	   	  	  1.8	  2008	   10.024	   10.581	   14.719	   -­‐	  0.3	  2009	   11.910	   10.419	   14.419	   -­‐	  2.8	  2014	   17.824	   	  	  9.403	   17.701	   	  	  2.4	  	  Table	  2	  illustrates	  quite	  clearly	  the	  different	  growth	  patterns	  of	  individual	  households’	  mortgage	  debt	  and	  U.S.	  government	  debt.	  In	  1997	  the	  start	  position	  was	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  http://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/66106/1/MPRA_paper_66106.pdf	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  Collective	  Household	  Economics©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  mortgage	  debt	   level	  was	  substantially	  below	   the	  government	  debt	   level.	   In	  2002	  such	  levels	  became	  nearly	  equal	  and	   in	  2003	  the	  mortgage	  debt	   level	  started	   to	  exceed	  the	  government’s	  debt	  level.	  This	  period	  lasted	  to	  2008.	  From	  2008,	  individual	  households	  collectively	   reduced	   their	   outstanding	   mortgage	   levels,	   while	   the	   government,	   as	   a	  consequence	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  had	  to	  increase	  its	  budget	  deficit	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  government	   guarantees	   for	   state	   sponsored	   enterprises	   like	   Fannie	   Mae	   and	   Freddy	  Mac.	  	  In	  1997,	  the	  combined	  government	  debt	  plus	  the	  mortgage	  debt	  levels,	  both	  being	  long-­‐term	  debt	  commitments	  of	  individual	  households,	  stood	  at	  about	  106%	  of	  GDP.	  By	  2007	  this	   debt	   to	   GDP	   level	   reached	   135.5%.	   In	   2014	   this	   debt	   level	   had	   risen	   further	   to	  153.8%	  of	  GDP.	  	  What	  are	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  this	  unparalleled	  growth	  in	  debt	  levels	  and	  why	  has	  such	  increase	  not	  led	  to	  very	  high	  economic	  growth	  levels?	  	  A	   free	   housing	   market	   is	   supposed	   to	   reflect	   free	   supply	   and	   demand.	   However	   if	   a	  buyer	  cannot	  base	  such	  demand	  on	  the	  use	  of	  own	  funds,	  the	  demand	  is	  no	  longer	  free.	  The	  use	  of	  about	  $10	  trillion	  of	  mortgage	  related	  funding	  in	  the	  U.S.	  shows	  that	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  market	  depends	  strongly	  on	  borrowed	  funds.	  	  	  Any	  borrowings,	   including	   borrowings	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   buying	   a	   home,	   require	   the	  lender	   and	   the	   borrower	   to	   have	   a	   sound	   understanding	   of	   long-­‐term	   future	   income	  levels	   of	   the	   borrower.	   Such	   understanding	   does	   not	   only	   apply	   to	   the	   individual	  borrower,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   collective	   of	   households	   and	   equally	   to	   the	   collective	   of	  financial	  institutions	  providing	  finance	  to	  the	  mortgage	  market.	  	  One	  can	  distinguish	  three	  types	  of	  risks	  in	  the	  assessment	  process:	  the	  income	  risks	  to	  the	  borrowers,	  the	  interest	  rate	  risks	  to	  the	  borrowers	  and	  the	  macro-­‐economic	  risks	  of	  lending	  too	  fast	  relative	  to	  house	  price	  developments.	  	  In	  1997,	  the	  nominal	  median	  income	  level	  of	  U.S.	  households	  stood	  at	  $35,365.	  By	  2002	  the	   level	   had	   reached	   $40,649;	   an	   increase	   of	   14.94%.	   The	   most	   exposed	   mortgage	  borrowers	  are	  those	  on	  or	  below	  the	  median	  income	  level.	  They	  usually	  do	  neither	  have	  the	  savings	  nor	  the	  income	  security	  to	  absorb	  shocks	  when	  changes	  happen	  in	  interest	  rates	  or	  there	  are	  house	  price	  developments.	  Over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2002	  median	  house	  prices	   went	   up	   by	   28.49%	   or	   nearly	   double	   the	   median	   income	   level.	   The	   net	   new	  mortgage	  lending	  levels	  went	  up	  from	  $	  180	  billion	  in	  1997	  to	  $	  706	  billion	  in	  2002;	  an	  increase	  of	  392%.	  However,	  even	  with	  all	  that	  extra	  money,	  the	  new	  housing	  starts	  only	  went	   up	  by	  15.17%.	  The	   remainder	   of	   the	   funds	  was	  used	   to	   force	  up	   existing	  house	  prices	   far	   in	   excess	   of	   income	   developments.	   This	   was	   the	  macro-­‐economic	   risk	   that	  banks	  did	  not	   take	   into	  account.	  Neither	  did	   it	  seem	  to	  bother	  the	  Federal	  Reserve,	  as	  the	   latter	   did	   not	   regard	   house	   price	   levels	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   economic	   growth	  developments.	  	  In	  2001	  and	  2002,	  the	  Fed	  was	  worried	  about	  the	  losses	  made	  on	  the	  stock	  markets	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  dot.com	  bubble.	  	  In	  early	  2001,	  it	  took	  action	  and	  lowered	  the	  base	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   8	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Collective	  Household	  Economics©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  rate	   from	  6%	   in	   January	   of	   that	   year	   to	   1.75%	  by	  December	   2001.	   Economic	   growth	  rates	  dropped	  from	  4.1%	  in	  1999	  to	  1%	  in	  2000	  and	  1.8%	  in	  2001.	  For	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  market,	  these	  interest	  rate	  steps	  induced	  the	  banking	  sector	  to	  step	  up	  rather	  than	  slow	  down	   mortgage	   lending	   levels,	   thereby	   increasing	   rather	   than	   reducing	   the	   macro-­‐economic	  risks	  to	  individual	  households.	  2002	  should	  have	  been	  the	  year	  which	  saw	  an	  orchestrated	  slow	  down	  in	  mortgage	  lending.	  	  Neither	   the	   Fed	   nor	   state	   banking	   regulators	   opted	   to	   slow	   down	   mortgage	   lending	  volumes	  in	  2002.	  They	  also	  failed	  to	  regulate	  the	  type	  of	  mortgage	  products	  that	  came	  on	  the	  market,	  including	  interest	  only	  mortgages,	  below	  market	  rate	  start	  up	  mortgages,	  low	  down-­‐payment	  and	  ‘low-­‐no	  doc’	  mortgages.	  These	  products	  –sometimes-­‐called	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgages-­‐	  became	  popular	  from	  2004	  onwards.	  Such	  products	  were	  frequently	  sold	   to	   individual	   households,	   who	   self-­‐certified	   their	   incomes	   without	   the	   banks	  checking	  on	  actual	   income	  levels.	  Finally,	  the	  move	  by	  banks	  to	  offload	  their	  mortgage	  risks	   to	  outside	   investors	   through	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  adding	  another	  risk	  layer	  on	  top	  of	  the	  macro-­‐economic	  risks	  that	  were	  already	  extremely	  high	  in	   the	   U.S.	   mortgage	   funding	   market.	   The	   regulators	   were	   happy	   to	   allow	   the	  widespread	  conversion	  of	  long-­‐term	  risks	  on	  mortgages	  into	  daily	  liquidity	  risks	  on	  the	  financial	  markets.	  	  What	   happened	   next	  was	   that	   the	   liquidity	   risks	   in	   some	  mortgage-­‐backed	   securities	  materialized;	   they	   were	   declared	   illiquid.	   In	   2007,	   illiquidity	   spread	   quickly	   in	   the	  financial	   markets,	   both	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	   in	   overseas	   markets	   like	   the	   U.K.	   This	   was	  followed	   by	   the	   banking	   crisis	   in	   2008,	   followed	   by	   the	   sharp	   rise	   in	   unemployment	  levels	  and	  the	  stagnation	  of	  income	  growth	  for	  individual	  households.	  	  	  
1.3	  Income	  and	  income	  distribution	  levels	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Graph	  2:	  GDP	  growth	  per	  household	  and	  median	  household	  income	  
	  
	  	  Two	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  Tables	  1	  and	  2	  and	  Graphs	  1	  and	  2:	  The	  first	  one	  is	  that	  the	  growth	  in	  net	  new	  mortgage	  lending	  level	  was	  excessive	  over	  the	  years	  1997-­‐2005.	  The	  excess	  can	  be	  measured	  by	   the	  speed	  of	  growth	   in	  mortgage	   lending	   levels	  (+600%)	   as	   compared	   to	   the	   growth	   in	   the	   nominal	   median	   household	   incomes	  (+30.5%).	   The	   second	   conclusion	   is	   that	   median	   house	   prices	   (+65%)	   increased	   at	  about	  double	  the	  speed	  of	  incomes	  growth	  (+30.5%)	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  	  From	  all	  these	  data	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  median	  income	  growth	  did	  not	  follow	  lending	  growth	  and	  did	  not	  follow	  median	  house	  price	  increases.	  The	  risks	  to	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  were	  apparent	  from	  2002	  and	  later	  years,	  but	  no	  action	  was	  taken	  to	  stop	  the	  trend,	  not	  by	  the	  bankers	  and	  not	  by	  the	  regulators.	  	  The	   key	   misunderstanding	   was	   that	   the	   supply	   of	   funds	   was	   thought	   to	   equally	  represent	  the	  demand	  for	  home	  mortgages.	  	  	  
	  
1.4	  The	  supply	  of	  mortgage	  funds	  and	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  approach	  
	  In	   the	  whole	   discussion	   about	  mortgage	   levels	   it	   is	   often	   assumed	   that	   the	   supply	   of	  funds	   must	   be	   equal	   to	   the	   demand	   for	   funds.	   	   However,	   as	   this	   paper	   has	   already	  demonstrated,	   the	   mortgage	   lending	   levels	   that	   were	   fuelled	   by	   the	   banking	   system	  went	   significantly	   beyond	  what	   the	   collective	   households	   needed.	  What	   the	   collective	  households	  needed	   in	  mortgage	   funding	  and	  what	  was	   subsequently	  delivered	  by	   the	  financial	  sector	  were	  based	  on	  totally	  different	  sets	  of	  parameters.	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  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  For	   instance,	   the	   supply	   side	  was	  based	  on	  available	   savings	   levels,	  which	   could	  have	  been	  allocated	  to	  government,	  companies	  and	  individual	  household	  borrowings.	  If	  profit	  levels	  are	  attractive	  on	  home	  mortgages	  than	  one	  may	  expect	  some	  pressure	  within	  the	  banking	   community	   to	   sell	   more	   mortgages.	   The	   supply	   side	   also	   has	   to	   adhere	   to	  prudential	   regulations.	   It	   is	   furthermore	  subject	   to	  prevailing	   interest	   rate	   levels.	  Last	  but	  not	   least	  banks	  aim	  to	  make	  profits.	  Such	  profit	  orientation	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  very	  short-­‐term	  oriented.	  	  The	   need	   for	   housing	   has	   very	   little	   to	   do	  with	   the	   fact	  whether	  mortgage	   funds	   are	  available	   or	   not.	   The	   need	   for	   housing	   stems	   from	   population	   growth	   levels,	   from	  changes	   in	   average	   family	   size	   and	   from	  changes	   in	   taste	  patterns	   for	   one	  or	   another	  type	  of	  home.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  the	  need	  for	  new	  homes	  can	  be	  estimated	  at	  about	  1.8	  million	  housing	  units	  annually.	  	  The	   need	   for	   new	  homes	   requires	   funding,	   either	   from	  own	   resources	   or	   from	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	  organizations.	  The	  demand	  for	  funds	  should	  be	  based	  on	  a	  level	  that	  ensures	   that	   individual	   households	   can	   fulfill	   their	   mortgage	   loan	   obligations	   at	   all	  times.	  	  	  
Table	  3:	  The	  need	  for	  home	  mortgage	  funds	  over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2008	  
	  Year	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Actual	  Increase	  in	  Mortgage	  	  Amounts	  x	  U.S.	  $billion	  
Actual	  	  Housing	  Starts	  per	  1July	  (ann.)	  x	  million	  
Needed	  Housing	  	  Starts	  x	  million	  
Annual	  CPI	  Inflation	  %	   Median	  House	  Prices	  (1July)	  Based	  on	  CPI	  x	  U.S.$	  
Increase	  in	  Mortgage	  Funds	  Needed	  x	  U.S.	  $billion	  1997	   	  	  180	   1.437	   1.8	   	   145,900	   	  1998	   	  	  301	   1.698	   1.8	   1.6	   148,234	   267	  1999	   	  	  377	   1.699	   1.8	   2.2	   151,495	   273	  2000	   	  	  382	   1.463	   1.8	   3.4	   156,645	   282	  2001	   	  	  509	   1.670	   1.8	   2.8	   161,031	   290	  2002	   	  	  706	   1.655	   1.8	   1.6	   163,607	   294	  2003	   	  	  881	   1.897	   1.8	   2.3	   167,370	   301	  2004	   	  	  950	   2.002	   1.8	   2.7	   171,889	   309	  2005	   1,053	   2.054	   1.8	   3.4	   177,733	   320	  2006	   	  	  998	   1.737	   1.8	   3.2	   183,420	   330	  2007	   	  	  701	   1.354	   1.8	   2.9	   188,739	   340	  2008	   	  	  -­‐	  32	   	  	  .923	   1.8	   3.8	   195,911	   353	  
	  In	  this	  table	  the	  need	  for	  new	  homes	  (1.8	  million	  new	  ones)	  is	  combined	  with	  the	  annual	  CPI	  inflation	  level	  to	  assess,	  based	  on	  the	  adjusted	  median	  house	  prices,	  how	  much	  an	  increase	  in	  mortgage	  funds	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  fund	  the	  new	  homes.	  The	  demand	  for	  funds	  is	  based	  on	  the	  CPI	  index	  changes	  and	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  if	  house	  prices	  move	   up	   in	   line	   with	   the	   CPI	   inflation	   level,	   nearly	   all	   households	   will	   be	   able	   to	  continue	  servicing	  their	  home	  mortgage	  debt.	  	  This	   epitomizes	   the	   need	   for	   funds	   approach,	   which	   seeks	   to	   define	   the	   demand	   for	  mortgage	  funds	  from	  the	  collective	  individual	  households’	  perspective	  rather	  than	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  from	   the	   supply	   side	   organized	   by	   the	   financial	   sector.	   It	   focuses	   on	   income	   levels	   of	  individual	   households,	   house	   price	   inflation,	   the	   need	   for	   new	   homes	   based	   on	  population	   growth,	   changes	   in	   average	   family	   size	   and	   changes	   in	   taste	   patterns.	   The	  need	   for	   funds	   approach	   does	   not	   deny	   that	   interest	   rate	   changes	   affect	   disposable	  income	  levels;	  it	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  funds	  need	  to	  be	  available	  to	  grant	  home	  mortgages,	  but	  it	  does	  guard	  against	  financial	  markets	  setting	  the	  demand	  for	  mortgage	  funds;	  the	  demand	  base	  should	  be	  set	  by	  the	  collective	  of	  individual	  households	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  financial	  markets.	  This	  is	  what	  Collective	  Households	  Economics	  is	  all	  about.	  	  If	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  approach	  had	  been	  applied	  in	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2008,	  the	  financial	  crisis	   would	   not	   have	   occurred;	   economic	   growth	   rates	   would	   have	   not	   been	   so	  seriously	   undermined	   as	   they	   have	   been	   from	   2008	   and	   2009.	   The	   U.S.	   government	  deficits	  would	   not	   have	   been	   so	   large	   and	   the	   current	   U.S.	   government	   debt	   position	  would	  have	  been	  substantially	  better.	  	  
	  
2	  Steps	  to	  help	  implement	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  approach	  	  	  
2.1	  Preventive	  measures.	  
	  
Volume	  levels	  
	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  traffic	  light	  system	  
	  When	  mortgage-­‐lending	   levels	   are	   increasing	   too	   rapidly,	   as	   was	   the	   case	   in	   2002,	   a	  system	  of	  traffic	  light	  management	  could	  have	  been	  introduced.	  This	  system	  could	  –and	  still	   can-­‐	   work	   as	   follows:	   The	   signal	   to	   the	   banking	   sector	   for	   continuing	   home	  mortgage	   lending	   as	  was	   done	   in	   previous	   periods	  would	   be:	   “green”.	   If	   the	   speed	   of	  lending	  was	  regarded	  as	  moving	  to	  the	  danger	  zone	  the	  “amber”	  signal	  could	  be	  flashed	  up.	  When	  the	  danger	  zone	  was	  reached,	  the	  “red”	  signal	  could	  come	  on.	  Banks	  or	  other	  financial	  institutions	  that	  would	  not	  follow	  the	  traffic	  light	  system	  could	  be	  punished	  on	  an	   individual	   basis,	   not	   by	   setting	   collective	   prudential	   levels,	   but	   by	   individualized	  ones,	  like	  individual	  reserve	  requirements	  or	  even	  speeding	  fines.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Interest	  rate	  changes	  
	  The	   simple	   theory	   says	   that	  when	   the	   price	   of	  money	   goes	   up,	   the	   volume	   of	  money	  demand	  will	  come	  down.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  complications	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  home	  mortgages	  market,	  which	  may	  not	  suit	  this	  simple	  theory.	  	  	  Firstly,	  a	  mortgage	  is	  a	  long-­‐term	  commitment	  by	  the	  borrowers.	  Just	  because	  the	  price	  of	  money	  changes	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  borrowers	  borrow	  any	  less	  or	  more	  than	  they	  have	   already	   outstanding.	   They	   usually	   are	   not	   in	   position	   to	   speed	   up	   repayments,	  rather	   the	  opposite	   if	   their	  mortgage	   is	  based	  on	  a	  variable	   interest	   rate;	   in	   the	   latter	  case,	   their	   disposable	   income	   will	   be	   reduced	   by	   the	   added	   burden	   of	   an	   increased	  interest	  rate.	  The	  effect	  on	  new	  borrowings	  depends	  on	  house	  prices,	  own	  savings	  and	  on	  the	  overriding	  need	  to	  find	  a	  place	  to	  live.	  As	  tables	  1	  and	  2	  have	  shown,	  even	  at	  the	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  top	  of	  the	  lending	  boom	  in	  2005,	  new	  borrowings	  never	  exceeded	  more	  than	  about	  10%	  of	  the	  outstanding	  home	  mortgage	  portfolio.	  	  Secondly,	  the	  experience	  after	  2008	  clearly	  showed	  that	  lowering	  of	  interest	  rates	  –even	  to	  the	  lowest	  rates	  on	  record-­‐	  did	  not	  encourage	  higher	  levels	  of	  mortgage	  borrowings,	  rather	   the	   opposite.	   Over	   the	   period	   2007-­‐2014	   mortgage	   borrowers	   reduced	   their	  collective	  borrowings	  by	  $1.2	  trillion	  or	  about	  12%	  of	  total	  mortgage	  borrowings	  as	  per	  end	   of	   2007.	   Foreclosure	   proceedings	   and	   home	   repossessions	   forced	   borrowers	   to	  concentrate	   on	   repaying	   rather	   than	   increasing	   their	   outstanding	   home	   mortgage	  portfolio.	  	  Thirdly,	  the	  wider	  issue	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  interest	  rates	  has	  to	  be	  addressed.	  House	  price	  inflation	  is	  of	  a	  different	  character	  than	  cost	  price	  inflation,	  the	  latter	  being	  determined	  by	   wages	   growth	   and	   price	   changes	   in	   commodities	   and	   intermediate	   products,	  including	  final	  products	  imported	  from	  abroad.	  House	  price	  inflation	  is	  either	  caused	  by	  excessive	  funding	  levels,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  the	  U.S.	  between	  1997	  and	  2007	  or	  by	  a	  low	  volume	  of	  new	  construction	  of	  homes,	  below	  the	  need	  of	  a	  growing	  population,	  as	  was	  the	  case	   in	   the	  U.K.	  due	   to	  planning	  restrictions.	  Cost	  price	   inflation	  can	  be	  caused	  by	  monopoly	   situations	  on	   the	   companies’	  or	   countries’	   side	  or	  by	   scarcity	   factors	   in	   the	  labor	  market.	  	  The	   lowering	  of	   interest	   rates	   in	  2001	   in	   the	  U.S.	  was	   aimed	  at	   helping	   the	   economic	  growth	   rate	   to	   strengthen.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   movement	   in	   the	   interest	   rate	  worsened	  the	  house	  price	  inflation	  case.	  The	  2004-­‐2006	  steep	  increase	  in	  interest	  rates	  from	  1.25%	  in	  June	  2004	  to	  5.25%	  in	  June	  2006	  did	  help	  to	  slow	  down	  economic	  growth	  rates,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  help	  to	  slow	  down	  mortgage	  lending	  levels	  during	  2004,	  2005	  and	  2006.	  Perhaps	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  have	  different	  approaches	  for	  combatting	  house	  price	  inflation	  levels	  than	  for	  fighting	  cost	  price	  inflation.	  	  
2.2	   Separating	   mortgage	   costs	   from	   funding	   costs:	   the	   Collective	   Household	  
approach	  
	  Individual	  households	  are	  best	  served	  by	  mortgage	  costs	  that	  do	  not	  fluctuate	  heavily.	  A	  scheme	   could	  be	   introduced	   that	  makes	   such	   approach	   feasible.	   Such	   a	   scheme	   could	  have	   an	   interest	   cost	   base	   of	   CPI	   level	   plus	   1%	   for	   the	   borrowers.	   This	   is	   a	   variable	  interest	  rate,	  but	  one	  that	  directly	  links	  income	  growth	  with	  interest	  charges.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  Collective	  Households	  scheme	  in	  that	  it	  ensures	  that	  nearly	  all	  mortgagees	  will	  be	  likely	  to	   fulfill	   their	  mortgage	   obligations.	   For	   the	  banks	   a	   funding	   return	  of	   Fed	   funds	   rate	  plus	  1.75%	  could	  be	  guaranteed.	  Of	  course	  at	  times	  there	  may	  differences	  between	  the	  CPI	  +1%	  borrowing	  rate	  by	  the	  mortgage	  holders	  and	  the	  Fed	  funds	  rate	  +1.75%	  by	  the	  banks.	  Government-­‐sponsored	   institutions	   such	   as	   Fannie	  May	   and	  Freddy	  Mac	   could	  settle	  such	  differences	  with	  the	  banks	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  U.S	  treasury	  in	  case	  of	  short	  falls.	  	  Surplus	  funds	  should	  be	  flowing	  back	  to	  the	  U.S.	  treasury.	  	  Such	  a	  Collective	  Households’	  scheme	  fulfills	  a	  number	  of	  objectives.	  The	  main	  objective	  is	  to	  separate	  the	  costs	  of	  home	  mortgage	  borrowing	  from	  the	  costs	  of	  lending,	  enabling	  borrowers	  to	  enjoy	  a	  rate	  of	  interest,	  which	  is	  set	  on	  a	  dynamic	  basis.	  If	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  Collective	  Household	  Economics©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  consumer	  price	  inflation	  goes	  up,	  it	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  wages	  will	  go	  up	  also.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  consumer	  prices	  come	  down	  the	  pressure	  to	  increase	  wages	  will	  be	  less	  and	  a	  lowering	  of	  mortgage	  interest	  costs	  will	  help	  households	  to	  maintain	  their	  disposable	  income	  for	  other	  purchases.	  For	  the	  lenders,	  the	  Fed	  funds	  rate	  determines	  their	  costs	  of	  funds.	   The	   Fed	   changes	   its	   rate	   to	   keep	   inflation	   under	   control	   (mostly	   cost	   price	  inflation)	  and	  to	  assist	   the	  economy	  in	   its	  economic	  growth	  endeavors.	  The	  Fed	   funds	  rate	   is	   a	   funding	   rate	   that	   currently	   applies	   to	   all	   different	   groups	   of	   households:	   a	  government,	  companies	  and	  individual	  households.	  Separating	  the	  long-­‐term	  mortgage	  borrowings	   from	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Fed	   funds	   rate	   offers	   the	   individual	   households	  that	  have	  a	  mortgage	  a	  better	  chance	   to	  keep	  up	  with	   their	  mortgage	  payments	  and	  a	  better	   chance	   to	  maintain	   their	   spending	   levels	   on	   other	   goods	   and	   services	   thereby	  benefiting	  the	  wider	  economy.	  	  The	  combination	  of	  volume	  control	  on	  the	  lending	  side	  and	  costs	  control	  over	  interest	  levels	  on	  the	  borrowers	  side	  will	  help	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  to	  grow	  on	  a	  much	  more	  stable	  basis.	  	  	  The	  transition	  of	  the	  existing	  mortgage	  portfolio	  to	  the	  new	  system	  of	  segregated	  costs	  to	  the	  borrowers	  and	  rewards	  for	  the	  lenders	  can	  be	  a	  gradual	  one.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  mark-­‐up	  on	  both	  lenders	  and	  borrowers	  is	  just	  an	  example	  of	  what	  could	  be	  agreed	  upon,	  but	  is	  certainly	  not	  set	  in	  stone.	  Secondly,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  trial	  the	  approach	  with	  new	  home	  mortgage	   borrowers,	   whereby	   each	   mortgage	   needs	   to	   have	   a	   repayment	   schedule.	  Gradually	  existing	  borrowers	  could	  be	  moved	  to	  the	  new	  system.	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  the	  income	  risks	  for	  all	  mortgage	  borrowers	  are	  reduced	  as	  soon	  as	  is	  practicable.	  Lower	   and	  median	   income	  mortgage	   holders	  will	   be	   the	   greatest	   beneficiaries.	   If	   the	  boom-­‐bust	   situation	   in	   the	   housing	  market	   is	   effectively	   tackled,	   it	   will	   also	   improve	  employment	  prospects	  for	  those	  seeking	  and	  for	  those	  in	  employment,	  keeping	  a	  job.	  	  
2.3	  Some	  tentative	  cost/benefit	  implications	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Government	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Table	  4	  compares	  the	  CPI	  plus	  1%	  and	  the	  average	  Fed	  funds	  rate	  plus	  1.75%	  










































































	  	  By	   separating	   the	   funding	   costs	   for	   the	   banks	   on	   their	   mortgage	   portfolio	   from	   the	  funding	   costs	   for	   individual	   households,	   the	   U.S.	   government	   achieves	   a	   prudential	  division	   in	   economic	   terms	   between	   Wall	   Street	   and	   Main	   Street.	   Such	   a	   barrier	   is	  needed	  to	  reduce	  the	  economic	  vulnerability	  of	  individual	  households;	  especially	  those	  that	  need	  to	  borrow	  to	  buy	  a	  home.	   	  The	  great	  economic	  weakness,	  which	  showed	  up	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  was	  that	  by	  co-­‐mingling	  these	  funding	  costs,	  1	  in	  6	  of	  every	  American	   household	   was	   confronted	   with	   foreclosure	   proceedings	   over	   the	   period	  2006-­‐2013	  and	  that	  nearly	  6	  million	  home	  owners	  were	  faced	  with	  home	  repossessions.	  In	  2009,	  45%	  of	  all	  existing	  home	  sales	  were	  of	  repossessed	  homes.	  	  From	  table	  4,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  there	  are	  years	  that	  the	  government	  will	  need	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  interest	  received	  from	  individual	  households	  and	  interest	  paid	  to	  the	  banking	  sector.	  2000-­‐2002	  was	  one	  such	  period.	  For	  2003-­‐2004	  the	  government	  would	  have	  been	  on	  the	  receiving	  end.	  2005-­‐2007	  it	  would	  be	  paying	  out	  again,	  but	  after	  that	  apart	  from	  2009	  the	  government	  would	  have	  been	  on	  the	  receiving	  end.	  	  The	   economic	   stability	   that	   will	   be	   created	   for	   individual	   households	   by	   this	   system	  helps	  to	  avoid	  increases	  in	  unemployment	  levels	  and	  to	  maintain	  spending	  levels	  when	  inflation	  levels	  are	  low.	  The	  system	  would	  create	  a	  type	  of	  people’s	  quantitative	  easing	  at	   times	  when	   interest	   rates	  on	   the	   financial	  markets	   are	  high	  and	   the	   system	   is	   self-­‐correcting	  when	  bank	  interest	  rates	  are	  low.	  
	  
3.	  The	  post	  financial	  crisis	  developments	  
	  
3.1	  New	  housing	  starts	  and	  home	  ownership	  
	  The	   impact	   of	   the	  mortgage	   crisis	   has	   lasted	   a	   long	   time.	   2006	  was	   the	   last	   year	   that	  slightly	   over	   1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  were	   started.	   The	   lowest	   points	  were	   reached	   in	  2009-­‐2011	  when	  around	  only	  600,	  000	  new	  homes	  were	  started	  per	  year,	  about	  a	  third	  of	   what	   population	   growth	   levels	   required.	   2012	   levels	   were	   somewhat	   better	   at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  830,	  000	  new	  homes,	  in	  2013	  the	  level	  increased	  to	  about	  1	  million,	  in	  2014	  to	  1.05	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  Collective	  Household	  Economics©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  million	   and	   by	   August	   2015,	   on	   an	   annualized	   basis	   to	   1.126	   million.	   However	   nine	  years	   after	   2006,	   this	   is	   still	   about	   a	   third	   below	   the	   needs	   for	   new	   homes	   based	   on	  population	  growth.	  	  The	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau	  supplies	  the	  data	  on	  home	  ownership.	  In	  2000	  about	  two	  thirds	  of	  all	  American	  households	  (66.2%)	  owned	  their	  own	  home.	  By	  June	  2004	  this	  level	  had	  increased	  to	  69.2%.	  In	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2015	  this	  level	  had	  dropped	  to	  63.7%,	  a	  level	  as	   low	   as	   in	   1990.	  What	   also	   happened	   is	   that	   non-­‐occupant	   owners	   have	   reached	   a	  record	   high;	   the	   latter	   includes	   real	   estate	   companies	   set	   up	   to	  make	   a	   profit	   out	   of	  renting	  homes.	  First	   time	  buyers	  now	  only	  make	  up	  29%	  of	  homebuyers	  compared	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  average	  of	  40%.	  	  
3.2	  Unemployment	  levels	  and	  the	  labor	  force	  participation	  rate	  	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  unemployment	  level	  dropped	  to	  5.1%	  in	  August	  2015,	  which	  is	  a	  major	  improvement	   over	   the	   more	   than	   10%	   reached	   at	   the	   height	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis.	  However	  the	  labor	  force	  participation	  rate,	  reflecting	  those	  able	  to	  work	  within	  the	  age	  group	  of	  doing	  so,	  has	  dropped	  strongly	  from	  67.3%	  in	  January	  2000	  to	  62.6%	  in	  August	  2015.	  	  
3.3	  Student	  loans	  
	  Student	  loans	  constitute	  the	  second	  largest	  level	  of	  debt	  by	  individual	  households	  after	  mortgage	   debts.	   Both	   are	   long-­‐term	   debt	   levels.	   According	   to	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   of	  New	   York	   at	   the	   end	   of	   2014	   $1.16	   trillion	   in	   student	   loans	  was	   outstanding.	   It	   also	  reported	   that	   student	   loan	   delinquencies	   and	   repayment	   problems	   appear	   to	   be	  reducing	  borrowers’	  ability	  to	  set	  up	  their	  own	  households.	  	  
3.4	  Outstanding	  mortgage	  and	  government	  debt	  levels	  since	  2008	  
	  Over	  the	  period	  2006-­‐2013,	  21.3	  million	  households	  were	  confronted	  with	  foreclosure	  proceedings5.	   This	   compares	   to	   the	   47.5	  million	   households	  who	   had	   a	  mortgage,	   or	  affecting	  nearly	  45%	  of	  all	  mortgagees.	  Over	  the	  same	  period,	  5.8	  million	  homes	  were	  repossessed.	  This	  represents	  1	  out	  of	  about	  every	  8	  households	  with	  a	  mortgage.	  These	  shocking	  statistics	  sum	  up	  the	  incompetence	  of	  the	  U.S.	  banking	  sector	  to	  control	  itself	  in	  mortgage	  lending.	  It	  also	  represents	  a	  failure	  to	  act	  by	  the	  regulatory	  authorities.	  	  
	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  pressures	  by	  the	  banking	  sector	  to	  repay	  outstanding	  mortgage	  loans,	   outstanding	   mortgage	   debt	   levels	   have	   been	   reduced	   by	   $1.2	   trillion	   over	   the	  period	  2007-­‐2014.	  Over	  the	  same	  period,	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  levels	  doubled	  from	  $9	  trillion	  in	  2007	  to	  $17.8	  trillion	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2014.	  Both	  are	  signs	  of	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  financial	   crisis	   had	   on	   individual	   households	   in	   the	   first	   place	   and	   on	   the	   U.S.	  government	  subsequently.	  If	  the	  collective	  mortgage	  levels	  had	  been	  better	  managed	  in	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2008,	  the	  subsequent	  years	  would	  have	  seen	  an	  increase	  in	  mortgage	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-­‐foreclosure-­‐statistics/	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  Economics©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  lending	   levels	   and	   a	   much	   lower	   level	   of	   U.S.	   government	   debt	   increase.	   The	   U.S.	  population	  did	   not	   stop	   growing	   suddenly	   in	   2008	   and	   in	   later	   years,	   neither	   did	   the	  need	  for	  funds	  for	  home	  mortgages.	   	  The	  imbalances	  created	  by	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  the	   run	   up	   to	   2008	   created	   the	   long-­‐term	   decline	   in	   home	   ownership	   rates,	   the	  increased	  levels	  of	  unemployment	  and	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  increased	  government	  debt	  levels.	  Economic	  growth	  levels	  over	  the	  years	  2008-­‐2015	  were	  seriously	  undermined	  by	  the	  irresponsible	  levels	  of	  home	  mortgage	  lending	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  2008.	  	  
	  
4.	  Some	  conclusions	  
	  
• A	   radical	   rethink	   is	   needed	   about	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   individual	   households	  obtain	  mortgage	  funds	  in	  the	  U.S.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  the	  lower	  and	  median	   income	  households,	  who	   rely	  most	  heavily	   on	  mortgage	  borrowings	   to	  get	  on	  the	  housing	  ladder.	  Risks	  for	  them	  were	  extremely	  poorly	  managed	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  2008.	  The	  approach	  to	  macro-­‐economic	  risk	  management	  should	  start	  with	  the	  collective	  of	  individual	  households,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  lenders.	  	  
• A	  primary	  plank	  of	  such	  a	  rethink	  entails	  the	  recognition	  that	  the	  parameters	  for	  lending	   by	   the	   banking	   sector	   are	   very	   different	   from	   the	   need	   for	   mortgage	  funds	   of	   the	   collective	   of	   individual	   households.	   Supply	   by	   the	   banking	   sector	  does	   not	   imply	   an	   equal	   level	   of	   demand	   by	   the	   collective	   of	   individual	  households.	  	  
• The	  need	   for	   funds	   approach	   is	   based	   on	  population	   growth	   levels,	   changes	   in	  average	  family	  size	  and	  changes	   in	  taste	  patterns	  for	  homes.	   It	   is	  also	  based	  on	  income	  growth	  levels.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  affordability	  levels,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  bank	  based	  profitability	  objectives.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  about	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  are	  needed	  annually.	  	  
• To	   implement	   the	  need	   for	   funds	   approach	   requires	   a	   change	   in	   volume,	   price	  and	   quality	   control	   measures.	   Volume	   control	   can	   be	   enforced	   with	   a	   “traffic	  light”	  system	  to	  be	  observed	  by	  lenders	  and	  enforced	  by	  regulators.	  Price	  control	  can	   be	   introduced	   by	   separating	   the	   interest	   costs	   paid	   by	   the	   individual	  households	   and	   those	   received	  by	   the	  banking	   sector.	  The	   collective	   individual	  households	  mortgage	  portfolio	  would	  greatly	  benefit	  if	  the	  interest	  charges	  were	  to	   be	   based	   for	   instance	   on	   CPI	   level	   +1%	   for	   the	   borrowers:	   the	   affordability	  principle.	  The	  lenders	  could	  receive	  Fed	  funds	  rate	  +1.75%:	  the	  profit	  principle.	  In	   case	  of	   shortfall	  or	   surplus	   the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  could	  even	  out	   the	  differences.	  Finally	   quality	   control	   measures	   could	   be	   put	   in	   place	   to	   ensure	   that	   all	  mortgages	  granted	  include	  a	  repayment	  element	  and	  do	  not	  include	  interest	  rate	  teasers.	  	  
• Collective	  Households	  Economics	  would	  help	  individual	  households	  to	  continue	  to	  be	  able	  to	  service	  their	  mortgage	  and	  simultaneously	  continue	  their	  spending	  levels	  on	  other	  goods	  and	  services.	  A	  dynamic	  balance	  can	  be	  achieved	  between	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  income	   growth	   and	  mortgage	   expenses.	   Student	   loans	   could	   be	   arranged	   in	   a	  similar	  fashion.	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